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Performance evaluation 
of INDECT security architecture
Evaluación del rendimiento 
de la arquitectura de seguridad INDECT
Abstract− This paper evaluates the performance of the 
key elements of the security architecture developed by 
the INDECT project. In particular it first evaluates three 
different concurrent error detection mechanism (parity 
check, Berger code, and cyclic redundancy check) deve-
loped in software- and hardware-based implementations 
of the INDECT block cipher. It also analyses the perfor-
mance hit in secure web servers when enabling TLS/
SSL with mutual authentication. Finally, it evaluates the 
throughput and delay of traffic in the virtual private ne-
twork based on the OpenVPN software package with the 
implemented INDECT block cipher. The results of these 
evaluations demonstrate that the proposed mechanis-
ms, and by extension the whole INDECT security archi-
tecture, are viable and can be used in high-performance 
Police information and communication systems.
Keywords− INDECT project; INDECT security architectu-
re; performance evaluation; Police ICT systems; security.
Resumen− Este artículo evalúa el rendimiento de los 
principales elementos de la arquitectura de seguridad 
desarrollada por el proyecto INDECT. En particular, en 
primer lugar evalúa tres mecanismos diferentes de de-
tección concurrente de errores (comprobación de pari-
dad, códigos Berger y verificación por redundancia cí-
clica) desarrollados en las implementaciones software 
y hardware del algoritmo de cifrado de bloque INDECT. 
También se analiza el impacto en el rendimiento de los 
servidores web seguros cuando se activa TLS/SSL con 
autenticación mutua. Por último, evalúa el rendimiento 
y el retardo del tráfico en una red privada virtual, basada 
en el software OpenVPN con el algoritmo de cifrado IN-
DECT. Los resultados de estas evaluaciones demuestran 
que los mecanismos propuestos, y  el algoritmo de cifra-
do INDECT, son viables y pueden usarse en sistemas de 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays ICT (Information and Communica-
tion Technology) systems require a constantly 
growing degree of security, because criminal ac-
tivities in the cyber space represent an increasin-
gly higher threat. Especially the law enforcement 
agencies (LEAs) have very strict demands for the 
security and privacy of data in their information 
systems.
INDECT (Intelligent information system suppor-
ting observation, searching and detection for secu-
rity of citizens in urban environment) is a research 
project funded by the EU 7th Framework Program 
that is developing cost-effective tools for helping 
European Police services to enforce the law and 
guarantee the protection of their citizens [1]. Thus, 
the so-called INDECT system is composed by a set 
of novel applications and ICT services designed to 
help Police forces in their current investigations, 
as well as to fight new forms of cyber-crime.
In particular, INDECT is also designing a secu-
rity architecture that was already described in [2]. 
The goal of this paper is to evaluate performance 
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of the main components of the INDECT security 
architecture to confirm that the newly proposed 
tools and mechanisms do not have any negative 
impact on the efficiency of the Police information 
systems that will be secured in this way.
2. INDECT SECURITY ARCHITECTURE t2
The INDECT security architecture [2] provides a 
set of common security services, including authen-
tication, authorization (access control), non-repu-
diation, privacy/auditing, communication security, 
data confidentiality and integrity, by using standar-
dized protocols and mechanisms. Fig. 1 shows a 
simplified view of the integrated INDECT security 
architecture for Police ICT systems.
Fig. 1. INDECT SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
Source: The authors.
The main components of proposed INDECT se-
curity architecture are:
• Public key infrastructure (PKI) – It issues, ma-
nages, stores and revokes X.509 certificates 
used in INDECT systems. Certificates are is-
sued to all INDECT users and ICT systems for 
authentication, as well as for securing their 
communications.
• LDAP user directory – It stores all users’ con-
tact data and credentials for legacy systems 
that do not support certificate-based authen-
tication. The user directory also stores general 
authorization information, such as users’ clea-
rance level or the specific applications they 
can access. 
• Audit server – All relevant user actions (e.g. 
accessing applications or requesting classi-
fied information) are logged, both locally and 
in a secure centralized system. These logs are 
constantly reviewed by security personnel and 
Police auditors in order to detect suspicious 
behaviors.
• INDECT web portal – It is the homepage of 
INDECT users, allowing them to access the di-
fferent services and applications available to 
them, according to particular scenarios (e.g. 
in a crisis). User authentication is based on 
X.509 certificates and/or user credentials sto-
red in the LDAP user directory. 
• Application servers and databases – They 
execute the INDECT services, applications and 
tools, and store their associated information. 
They also authenticate users by means of user 
certificates, although they can also handle 
application-specific user authorization attribu-
tes (e.g. which CCTV cameras a given user may 
access). We assume that most INDECT appli-
cations provide a web-based interface, and 
most ICT services will also be web-based, im-
plementing SOAP or REST interfaces and using 
TLS/SSL for secure communications, featuring 
mutual client-server authentication.
• Virtual private networks (VPNs) – They are 
employed for protecting communications with 
external Police users and devices. Only encryp-
ted traffic is allowed to go through the Police 
data center firewall, which blocks all external 
traffic by default and should feature additional 
security mechanisms such as intrusion detec-
tion/protection systems (IDS/IPS).
• Smart cards (SC) – The store users’ certifica-
tes, which are issued by the INDECT PKI and 
used for access control by the central INDECT 
web portal, as well as for encrypting and sig-
ning e-mails and documents.
2. 1 INDECT cryptographic algorithms
Nowadays, encryption is used to ensure the 
confidentiality of digital data. It is the most impor-
tant task of modern cryptography. Encryption re-
lies on transforming confidential data into another 
encrypted form, unreadable to anyone except of 
users which possess the cryptographic key. The 
encryption is realized by using an appropriate al-
gorithm, called cipher.
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Some novel cryptographic algorithms were deve-
loped in the Work Package 8 of EU INDECT project. 
The main algorithm in this group is a symmetric ci-
pher, called INDECT Block Cipher (IBC). In general, 
IBC cipher consists of nonlinear transformations, 
which are dependent on the key [3]. These functions 
ensure the protection of confidential data. The cru-
cial transformation during the encryption process in 
IBC is substitution by secure S-boxes. These S-boxes 
makes each encryption secure and highly unique. 
The construction of this cipher is based on substitu-
tion and permutation functions that are used in each 
round of the IBC cipher. This structure ensures a high 
performance and a fast data encryption. 
The IBC algorithm is a block cipher, where each 
256-bit block of data is divided into 64 sub-blocks. 
Sub-blocks are transformed by the appropriate S-box 
and output values are concatenated back into the 
256-bit block. At the end of the round, the permu-
tation – also based on S-box – is performed. This 
function modifies the 256-bit block of data. All these 
steps are repeated for a number of iterations (mini-
mum 8 times).
One of the most novel ideas provided in the IBC 
cipher is unique approach to cryptographic key. The 
key is a pseudo-random sequence; however it is used 
to create new S-boxes. These S-boxes are based on 
the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) S-box, and 
ensure high-level of security. This approach ensures 
that 5.35·1018 new S-boxes is used in IBC cipher. 
All new S-boxes are used as a non-linear transforma-
tion: substitution or permutation.
2. 2 INDECT Public Key Infrastructure
One of the main characteristics of INDECT 
project is that it is composed by multiple hetero-
geneous systems that exchange sensitive infor-
mation among them. Therefore it is necessary to 
fulfill all requirements for information security: ac-
cess control, authentication, non-reputation, data 
confidentiality, communication security, data inte-
grity, availability and privacy [4]. One of the main 
elements of the security infrastructures being de-
ployed to provide these security properties is the 
INDECT Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). This PKI is 
the base for creating a heterogeneous and secure 
environment, based on X.509 certificates, public 
keys and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms. 
The INDECT PKI architecture has a hierarchical, 
two-level structure [4].
PKI is a common way to solve the problems re-
lated to the distribution of public keys, because it 
offers the scalability that is required for large com-
munication and information infrastructures. A PKI 
is usually used to create policies and mechanisms 
for asymmetric key management, where public 
keys are distributed in the form of the so-called 
digital certificates. However, in INDECT the infor-
mation that is included in certificates is more than 
just a public key, since they are also employed for 
authentication and authorization purposes. Certi-
ficates are digitally signed to ensure the integrity 
and validity of contained information [5].
For issuing a certificate the following data are 
required and registered:
• Username and password - used by RA to ac-
cess user’s certificate data. RA can edit certi-
ficate data until sends request to CA to issue 
user’s certificate.
• User’s a-mail address - obligatory information 
for issuing the certificate.
• Common name (CN) - this value is used as a 
short textual description of certificate. Usually 
the name of Police officer can be used.
• Country - in a national LEA this field will be 
same for all users, but in an international LEA 
organization this field may have of the country 
of origin of the user.
• Organization - this field should be the user’s or-
ganization name. In our case, it can specify the 
LEA office (for example LEA-EU, LEA-BG, etc.).
• Given name – the first name of the user.
• Surname – the last name of the user.
• UID - this is an extension field of X.509v3 certifi-
cates that is employed as a unique identifier for 
the Police user (for example the officer number).
• Lvl - this field shows maximum clearance level 
of the user. This field is also an extension to 
the standard certificate structure, and the five 
possible values are from 0 (Unclassified) to 4 
(Top Secret).
Another important thing is key usage. Based on 
specific functions that INDECT PKI users have, we 
define following possibilities for using of certifica-
te separated in two main areas – key usage and 
extended key usage Table I:
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TABLE I 
KEY USAGE AREAS
INDECT PKI user               
certificate key usage
Digital signature
Non-repudiation
Key encipherment
Data encipherment
INDECT PKI user               
certificate extended key 
usage
Client authentication
Email protection
Time stamping
SSH client
MS smart card logon
MS document signing
MS Encrypted File System 
(EFS)
MS EFS recovery (only for 
administrators)
PDF signing
Source: The authors.
2. 3 INDECT communications security
Given the distributed nature of the INDECT sys-
tem, one of the main components of the secure 
communication infrastructure is a virtual private 
network (VPN) framework that will enable secure 
communications among multiple remote nodes 
and servers interconnected over public networks. 
Nowadays VPNs are mostly based on two different 
technologies – SSL (Secure Socket Layer) and IP-
sec (Internet Protocol Security).
The most suitable open-source SSL VPN solu-
tion is the OpenVPN software package [6]. Open-
VPN can be installed in computers or smartpho-
nes with almost any of current operating systems 
(Linux, Windows, Mac OS X, Android, iOS). Open-
VPN offers two basic modes that run either as a 
layer 2 or layer 3 VPN. Within the INDECT system, 
users will employ mainly OpenVPN to securely 
communicate between their remote terminals 
(desktop, laptop, tablet, smartphone, etc.) and 
servers located in the police headquarters. The IN-
DECT Devices CA will be employed to authenticate 
the individual terminals.
The Strong Swan software package [7] provides 
an open-source IPsec VPN solution. StrongSwan 
can be installed in computers or smart phones 
with various operating systems (Linux, Mac OS X, 
FreeBSD, Android). It is fully compatible with other 
standard IPsec VPN implementations, and thus 
can be used in networks with mixed equipment. 
StrongSwan implements both IKEv1 and IKEv2 
(internet key exchange) protocols, and it fully su-
pports IPv6.
Both types of VPN software can employ pre-sha-
red keys, X.509 certificates, or smart cards for the 
device authentication.
3. ENCRYPTORS’ ERROR DETECTION PER-
FORMANCE EVALUATION t2
Currently, INDECT Block Cipher (IBC) has a 
few software implementations. One of them was 
presented in [8]. The next step towards using this 
application in practice was implementation of 
error detection methods to increase the reliability 
of encryption software. It ensures the higher level 
of data security. The console-based interface of a 
new software implementation – IBC cipher with 
error detection algorithms [9] – is presented in 
Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. INTERFACE OF SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION OF IBC CIPHER WITH ERROR DETECTION METHODS [9]
Source: The authors.
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Three different error detection algorithms 
were implemented in the software IBC encryptor: 
parity check, Berger code and cyclic redundancy 
check (CRC). Parity checks if a number is even 
or odd – in this implementation refers to the 
evenness or oddness of a particular set of bits. 
The implementation contains four types of parity 
checks – depending on the amount of parity bits 
(i.e. 1, 2, 4 or 8 bits). A Berger code is an error-de-
tecting code that computes the number of ‘0’ (or 
‘1’) in the given set of bits. In the implementation 
every single bit of 32 byte data block is checked 
for being ‘0’. A cyclic redundancy check (CRC) is 
a popular error-detecting code based on polyno-
mial division. 
Fig 3. AVERAGE NUMBER OF DETECTED ERRORS FOR DIFFERENT 
METHODS (5 ERROR BITS WERE INSERTED DURING THE ENCRYPTION 
PROCESS)
Source: The authors.
Fig. 4. AVERAGE NUMBER OF DETECTED ERRORS FOR DIFFERENT 
METHODS (10 ERROR BITS WERE INSERTED DURING THE ENCRYPTION 
PROCESS)
Source: The authors.
Each implemented error detection method 
detects different amount of errors during the en-
cryption process. The average number of detected 
faults for two different numbers of inserted errors 
(5 bits and 10 bits) is presented in Fig. 3 and 
Fig. 4. It was proved that CRC algorithm success-
fully detects any occurred fault. However it does 
not provide any information about the amount of 
errors. Parity check based on 1-bit has worse error 
detection success rate, because any even number 
of errors were not detected. Berger code is much 
better method than 1-bit and 2-bit parity: howe-
ver for a small amount of errors, the parity check 
based on 4-bits is able to detect faults with bet-
ter precision. Although, the parity check based on 
8-bits provides the significant overhead, this me-
thod detects almost a half of provided errors in the 
encrypted data.
For the hardware implementation of IBC ci-
pher with error detection methods, a Xillinx Spar-
tan-3AN board –based on 90 nm technology – 
was chosen [10]. It has a relatively low cost and 
enough efficiency, which were the main reasons 
why this platform was chosen.
The Spartan-3AN board – presented in Fig. 5 
– consists of a few basic programmable function 
elements: configurable logic blocks (build logic and 
storage elements), input/output blocks, RAM block 
(data storage), multiplier blocks, and Digital Clock 
Manager (DCM) blocks. The Spartan-3AN board 
consists of various ports and input/output controls 
like LCD, LEDs or switches. For IBC implementation 
the XC3S700AN version of Spartan-3AN board has 
been used. It is characterized by memory’s parame-
ters and I/O specifications:
• System gates: 700K
• Logic cells: 13,248
• Dedicated multipliers: 20
• Block RAM blocks: 20
• Block RAM bits: 360K
• Distributed RAM bits: 92K
• Flash size bits: 8M
• User flash bits: 5M
• Clock speed: 50MHz
In the hardware implementation of IBC cipher 
Concurrent Error Detection (CED) functionality 
was also added. CED is a method of detecting 
errors while the algorithm is being processed. 
It allows verifying the results of encryption – if 
some random errors appear, the CED module 
will inform about this fact. Hardware encryptors 
should be equipped with CED methods, because 
some kind of faults in the internal structure of 
hardware encryptor may cause specific errors in 
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the encrypted cipher text. This may be used by 
potential attackers to give them some informa-
tion about the key used in the encryption process 
or the encrypted message.
Fig. 5. XILINX SPARTAN 3AN DEVICE
Source: The authors.
Fig. 6. MAXIMUM FREQUENCY FOR HARDWARE ENCRYPTOR WITH AND 
WITHOUT ERROR DETECTION METHODS
Source: The authors.
Even a single internal error may cause multiple 
errors in the output data because of the specific 
functions used several times during the encryp-
tion process (i.e. substitutions and permutations).
Implemented CED methods provide some 
kind of redundancy, i.e. in hardware resources 
or operation time [9]. Therefore, proper CED de-
sign and implementation are crucial. In Fig. 6 the 
maximum frequency for three kinds of encryptors 
were shown: without any CED technique, with pa-
rity check and with Berger code. The parity check 
does not have any negative impact to frequency. 
However it requires more hardware elements: sli-
ces, BRAMs and Look-up Tables (LUTs) which build 
logic and storage elements. The implementation 
of Berger code requires even more hardware ele-
ments and significantly reduces maximum fre-
quency. However, the maximum frequency for both 
CED methods do not exceed the clock speed of 
Spartan device (50 MHz), thus these two solutions 
can be used in practice.
4. HTTPS AND MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A key protocol of the INDECT security architec-
ture is HTTPS, since most INDECT applications, 
including the INDECT web portal, provide a web 
interface and/or REST or SOAP ones, and HTTPS 
has been specifically designed to secure this kind 
of web sessions. Actually, HTTPS just refers to the 
hypertext transport protocol (HTTP) running on top 
of the transport layer security/secure sockets la-
yer (TLS/SSL) protocol, which is the one encrypting 
and protecting the integrity of communications.
However these extra security mechanisms do 
not come without costs. The performance impact 
of HTTPS has been studied along time in the litera-
ture. In 1999, Apostolopoulos et al. [11] reported 
that serving web pages over TLS/SSL was two or-
ders of magnitude slower than regular ones, and 
increased the latency above 300 ms, mainly due 
to the TLS handshake protocol. Later, in 2006, 
Coarfa et al. [12] reported that the TLS/SSL im-
pact was reduced to less than one order of mag-
nitude, and was mainly due to RSA decryption of 
master key. More recently, it has been reported 
[13] that deploying TLS/SSL may only incur in 12-
40% penalty degradation thanks to session reuse. 
Therefore, the technological evolution has greatly 
improved the deployment of TLS/SSL in web ser-
vers, and thus seems ready to be employed in se-
cure architectures.
However the INDECT security architecture em-
ploys one little-known feature of TLS/SSL: mutual 
authentication, which has not been considered 
in the mentioned performance studies. With mu-
tual authentication, both the server and the client 
provide their certificates, so both are mutually au-
thenticated, instead of only the server as in regular 
TLS/SSL sessions. This way, users can authentica-
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te against any web-based INDECT service automa-
tically by using the certificates stored in their smart 
cards, instead of typing a username and password.
In order to evaluate the performance penalty of 
client authentication in TLS/SSL, we have deployed 
a small testbed composed by an Apache 2.2 web 
server running in a Dell PowerEdge 1950 server 
(4x Intel Xeon CPU E5420 @2.50GHz, 8GB RAM, 
Linux 2.6.32-64 bits) and the Apache JMeter 2.11 
benchmark tool running on a Dell Latitude E6330 
laptop (Intel Core i5-3320M CPU @2.60GHz, 8GB 
RAM, Linux 3.8.13-64 bits) interconnected with a 
Fast Ethernet LAN. Table II shows the results of 
the performance tests, where a small static HTML 
page (177 bytes) was downloaded 10,000 times 
consecutively by 16 parallel threads, either using 
HTTP, HTTPS with server authentication or HTTPS 
with mutual authentication. To study the effect of 
the full TLS/SSL handshake protocol, session reu-
se was enabled/disabled in all scenarios. The ser-
ver certificate (2048 bit RSA key) has an associa-
ted chain with two CAs (4096 bit RSA keys), while 
the client certificate (2048 bit RSA key) chain has 
a single CA (4096 bit RSA key).
The test results in Table II show that TLS/SSL 
still has some impact on the performance of web 
servers nowadays (i.e. 39% throughput penalty 
between HTTP and HTTPS with session reuse). 
As previous works in the literature have already 
identified, the main source of overhead is the TLS 
handshake protocol and the required public key 
cryptography operations. Disabling session reuse 
reduces the performance of a HTTPS web server 
by 60% and increases the latency 2.65 times. 
However, once TLS/SSL is enabled, the further 
effect of mutual authentication is minimal both 
in latency and throughput, either with or without 
session reuse. 
Therefore these results show that it is feasible 
to employ TLS/SSL to protect web traffic within the 
INDECT security architecture, as well as to employ 
client certificates to implement a secure user au-
thentication mechanism.
5. VIDEO STREAMING OVER OPENVPN PER-
FORMANCE EVALUATION
The INDECT block cipher (IBC), which was des-
cribed in Section 2.1, has also been implemented 
into the OpenSSL 0.9.8v library. Since OpenVPN 
software package uses OpenSSL to perform all 
cryptographic operations, it is also possible to pro-
tect INDECT VPN infrastructure with IBC. A Open-
VPN package that uses the modified OpenSSL 
0.9.8v cryptographic library supports the following 
IBC cipher modes: INDECT-128-CBC, INDECT-192-
CBC, and INDECT-320-CBC supporting 128, 192 
and 320 bit long keys with cipher-block chaining 
(CBC) mode of operation. 
One of the scenarios where OpenVPN can be 
employed is to secure the communications be-
tween a CCTV camera and its INDECT application 
server. Because video streaming requires high 
throughput and low delay, it is necessary to carry 
out a performance test to confirm the applicability 
of OpenVPN with IBC for this scenario.
To analyze the performance of OpenVPN cryp-
tographic operations, a benchmark using iperf and 
ping tools has been performed. iperf has been used 
to measure the throughput and ping to measure the 
delay. Two directly connected desktop computers 
with Ubuntu 10.04 LTS operating system, a Pen-
tium 4 processor running at 3.06 GHz and Gigabit 
Ethernet network interface cards were used in this 
test. The measured results of the throughput and 
delay are shown in Table III. In addition to the three 
IBC cipher variants, other cipher algorithms were 
also tested for comparison purposes. TCP window 
size was set to 85.3 KB during all measurements. 
It is also worth mentioning that OpenVPN uses LZO 
(Lempel-Ziv-Oberhumer) compression to reduce 
the amount of transmitted traffic.
The results of these measurements in Table III 
show that the performance of the new IBC cipher 
is significantly worse than the other more mature 
ciphers. This is due to fact that the IBC code is 
not yet optimized, especially when compared with 
the AES cipher that is the most popular symmetric 
cipher nowadays, and subject of continuous opti-
mizations in past years. However, the measured 
throughput for all IBC ciphers (more than 68 Mbps 
with a software implementation) is sufficient for 
the transmission of high quality video. This as-
sumption was confirmed by a test, in which a vi-
deo stream was transported from the IP camera 
(D-Link DCS-2100+) to the computer via the Open-
VPN tunnel. A more thorough test would require 
transmission of several video streams from mul-
tiple cameras to the destination in the OpenVPN 
server.
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TABLE II
PERFORMANCE OF MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION IN TLS/SSL
HTTP
HTTPS
-client
+reuse
HTTPS
-client
-reuse
HTTPS
+client
+reuse
HTTPS
+client
-reuse
Throughput (op/s) 561,37 341,49  133,71 350,32 116,01 
Avg. latency (ms) 25 43 114 41 133
Source: The authors.
web-based communications of most INDECT sys-
tems, including the INDECT web portal.
Thirdly, the throughput and delay of traffic, 
which was transmitted via the OpenVPN tunnel 
with the IBC cipher, were measured.
All these performed tests confirmed that, al-
though the proposed security tools and mechanis-
ms in the INDECT security architecture could have 
a negative influence on the performance of the 
communication, this performance penalty is not 
too high to prevent their use in LEA systems and 
networks.
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